What does Frankfurt believe about free will?
What does Frankfurt believe about free will?
He is known as a Traditional Compati- bilist because he believes that people have free will only if they are not forced and their actions have been “willed” by them alone.
Is Frankfurt a hard determinist?
Frankfurt’s objection According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise. Frankfurt’s examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behavior even though they lack the freedom to act otherwise.
What is a second order volition Frankfurt?
A first order desire is a desire for anything other than a desire; a second order desire is a desire for a desire. But when a person does want the first order desire to be effective, when they want it to be their will, Frankfurt calls this a second order volition. Some creatures have no second order volitions.
Does a wanton have free will?
The wanton addict fails to have a free will vacuously, since he has no desires one way or the other concerning his will. The willing addict fails to have a free will, despite the fact that his will is precisely what he wants–has the second-order volition for-it to be.
What is an act of free will?
free will, in humans, the power or capacity to choose among alternatives or to act in certain situations independently of natural, social, or divine restraints.
What is the will according to Frankfurt?
will: a first-order desire which is effective, i.e. that causes one to do what one desires to do. A desire to eat a bag of potato chips is one’s will, in Frankfurt’s sense, if that desire brings one to actually eat the bag of potato chips.
What does second order desires mean?
Second-order volition are desires about desires, or to desire to change the process, the how, of desiring. Examples would be desires to want to own a new car; to want to meet the pope; or to want to quit drinking alcohol permanently.
What do you call someone who believes in free will?
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent. Compatibilists believe that freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.
